Summit in Rio in 1992, could therefore substitute itself for a possible convergence.
5
But it would have been difficult to conceive that, on the one hand, Northern countries' voluntary investments realisation could represent a supplementary threat for biodiversity in Southern countries and, on the other hand, the latter being affected not only by climate change but also by measures taken to face up to it. 6 Owing to these possible negative interactions between the UNFCCC and the CBD, consistency had to be sought when elaborating provisions for including carbon sinks under the CDM. Parties to the CBD, having called in 2000 for the strengthening of cooperation with the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, 7 underlined that 'the Convention is fulfilling its leadership role in international biodiversity issues' and therefore 'other international processes should actively support implementation of the Convention, in a manner consistent with their respective frameworks'. 8 In answer to this call, the necessity to develop synergies between both Conventions was clearly affirmed by the parties to the UNFCCC, at their seventh Conference held in Marrakech. 9 They committed in this way by prohibiting inducements to deforestation, and working on the assumption that land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities must contribute to the conservation of biodiversity.
10
A mandate was given to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice of the Convention to develop definitions and modalities, to be adopted in 2003, for including afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM, 'taking into account impacts on biodiversity and natural ecosystems'. 11 The draft text was far from being finalised when presented to the Conference. This contributed to intense negotiations between the parties. The context was not favourable for further discussions on an issue that had already been the object of high tensions three years ago at the Hague Conference. The stillborn nature of the Kyoto Protocol was also at issue because of the Russian representatives' contradictory declarations about its ratification, necessary to its entry into force. An agreement was necessary to further the Kyoto process. This required the inclusion of measures on carbon sinks to satisfy the promoters of this agenda, among which Russia. The ultimate agreement reached could be summarised as follows: the difficulties raised by taking 5 Carbon sequestration activities may contribute to climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation. Likewise, implementing the provisions of the CBD may promote conservation and enhancement of sinks, as required by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (respectively Arts 4(1)d, and 2(1)a, ii Decision 1/CP.7, The Marrakech Ministerial Declaration. 10 Draft decision -CMP/1, Land use, land-use change and forestry, resp. § 1, c of the Annex and § 1, e.
For the first commitment period, reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1. 11 Decision 11/CP.7, Land use, land-use change and forestry, § 2, e, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1.
carbon sinks into account were resolved, except those relative to impacts on biodiversity, which were left unaddressed.
The statement of precise provisions intended for guaranteeing compliance with the CBD was a necessity. Steps to secure its implementation have been devoid of political will, an important issue given its lack of legally binding strength.
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Admittedly, parties to the UNFCCC 'have cognizance of relevant provisions of international agreements that may apply to afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism'. 13 A real lack of articulation with the CBD nevertheless appears from the text of the decision they adopted (hereafter 'decision on sinks in the CDM'), so that the issue of a challenge of the biological conservation objective, pursued by the Convention in its first article, can be raised. After discussing how the implementation of this Decision could generate potential conflicts between the UNFCCC and the CBD, this paper will conclude that synergies between the two seem uncertain.
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
Integration of some provisions of the CBD in the Decision on carbon sinks in the CDM was assuredly justified by an examination of the Marrakech Accords of 2001: 'the implementation of land use, land-use change and forestry activities contributes to the conservation of biodiversity and sustainable use of natural resources'.
14 These activities lie within the expanded programme of work on forest biological diversity, which promotes 'restoration of forest biological diversity in forests established on former forestlands and other landscapes, including in plantations'.
15 Now, activities promoted by this programme do not seem likely to contribute to the realisation of the objective that should be pursued by potential investors, namely sequestering the maximum amount of carbon. This explains the relative disinterest in biological diversity considerations demonstrated by the parties to the UNFCCC. 
SEQUESTRATION OF
degraded land restoration. 16 The contribution to the sustainable development of the host party, which should result from realising a project activity, is not, however, the first finality of the latter. The decision of a state, or a firm, to take part in the CDM will be underlain by economic optimisation research. This means that a project activity will be realised under the CDM only if emission credit acquisition costs are lower than those which could result from investments intended for reducing their own emissions.
Afforestation and reforestation project activities should essentially be carried out with the aim of sequestering a maximum amount of carbon, in order to compensate the domestic emissions of investors. This objective is, however, very difficult to adapt to biodiversity considerations. It should lead to the use of large-scale fastgrowing species plantations, such as eucalyptus, acacia and pine.
17 These kinds of forestry activities can result in monocultures, greater fertiliser utilisation, and the use of genetically modified seeds, and can accelerate soil erosion in areas affected by desertification. It could therefore have adverse impacts in terms of biological diversity conservation, without contributing in a viable manner to climate change prevention and mitigation.
18 It could nevertheless be privileged, as shown by some projects realised so far, 19 for presenting a financial interest for private investors and host parties: high yield of fibre of eucalyptus and pine represents a source of potential profit for the pulp industry, and export revenues for developing countries in exchange for concession of their lands.
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THE LACK OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS BY THE PARTIES TO THE UNFCCC
Risks of adverse impacts on biodiversity could have been prevented by parties to the UNFCCC in two ways: by setting up a list of eligible activities under the CDM, or excluding from its scope activities likely to represent a serious environmental threat. On the contrary, they decided that all project activity is eligible under the CDM, even if potentially invasive alien species or genetically modified organisms are used. 21 First, the right to use potentially invasive alien species must be compared with Article 8(h) of the CBD which invites the parties 'to prevent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species', and with the decision they adopted in 2002 specifically dedicated to those species. 22 This decision specifies that, considering those species represent one of the primary threats to biodiversity, an entire and effective implementation of Article 8(h) of the CBD is a priority. Its annex states for that purpose some guiding principles which should guide state action, principally that 'priority should be given to preventing the introduction of invasive alien species, between and within States'.
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These principles are non-binding, as explicitly stated by the introduction of the annex. Their integration in the above-mentioned decision on the adoption of an extended programme of work on forest biological diversity, whose one objective consists in 'preventing the introduction of invasive alien species that threaten ecosystems, and mitigating their negative impacts on forest biological diversity in accordance with international law', 24 nevertheless contributes to confer on them a certain legal value. Above all, the parties to the UNFCCC were expressly invited 'to consider this matter when it considers measures for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change'.
25 But this call seems to have been heard by its sole Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice. 26 The Conference of the Parties adopted for its part a decision whose implementation risks representing a source of latent conflict with a decision adopted one year before within the CBD.
Second, if the use of genetically modified organisms (GMO) is not forbidden by the CBD, its Article 8(g) foresees the establishment and the maintaining of means of regulation, managing or controlling the risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms (LMO). It was precisely for this reason that the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted on 29 January 2000. 27 It establishes a framework on transboundary movements of LMOs that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. Acknowledgement of the right for Northern countries to use genetically modified seeds in Southern countries therefore marginalises the importance of biotechnological risks, as well as the precautionary principle.
28 Furthermore, even supposing the use of some GM tree species involves low risks for biodiversity, they may be fast-growing species, and by definition potentially non-native. Such projects would therefore appear unable to contribute either to in-situ conservation of biological diversity, promoted by Article 2 of the CBD, 
or to the reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss, the declared mission of the Strategic Plan for the CBD adopted in 2002. 30 The lack of definition of a maximal limit to the plantation area, as well as a minimum number of species to be planted, finally attests that industrial monocultures might constitute climate change prevention and mitigation measures. So the decision on carbon sinks in the CDM raises the possibility for Northern countries to carry out in Southern countries the realisation of any project activity, irrespective of their impacts on biodiversity, and consequently of provisions of the CBD.
UNCERTAIN SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
To be realised, project activities must be registered by the Executive Board of the CDM, the authority in charge of issuing emission credits. The project must to that effect have been validated by an operational entity (a domestic legal entity or an international organisation) on the basis on a project design document presented by the project participants (namely the investors), and approved by the designated national authority of each party involved. 31 At that point, the project participants describe the environmental impacts of their activities. However, the decision on sinks in the CDM is not very restricting about information to be mentioned, entrusting each party involved with the sovereign appreciation of eventual incidences of the project on biodiversity.
THE LACK OF OBLIGATION FOR INVESTORS TO DESCRIBE IMPACTS OF THEIR PROJECT ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
The reference in the decision on sinks in the CDM to the ecosystem approach, cornerstone of the CBD, might have attested the will to promote durability of projects, as required by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as synergies between both Conventions. This approach is defined as 'a strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way'; it requires knowledge of the ecosystem functions and the role of components of biological diversity, and deals with the complex and dynamic nature of ecosystems. 32 For that matter several organs of the CBD recommended its application to climate change mitigation and adaptation projects. An ecosystem approach could, however, be subject to a limited application under the CDM. Project participants must precisely describe, in accordance with the decision on sinks in the CDM, the present environmental conditions of the area of the proposed project activity (climate, hydrology, soils, ecosystems, possible presence of rare or endangered species and their habitats). But it could be something different as regards the description of impacts of the project on natural surroundings. Though project participants shall provide 'documentation on the analysis of the environmental impacts, including impacts on biodiversity, natural ecosystems, and impacts outside the project boundary of the proposed afforestation or reforestation project activity', 'information on, inter alia, hydrology, soils, risk of fires, pests and diseases' -items relevant to the ecosystem approach -should only be included 'where applicable' in this analysis.
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It seems that the approval of the use of potentially invasive alien species and genetically modified organisms could have been accompanied by an obligation to present relevant information on potential consumption of water, and resistance to diseases and pests. Their use is, on the contrary, facilitated. Possible discrepancies with the provisions of the CBD can be underlined. The latter states that intentional introductions of invasive alien species and GMOs within a country should not take place without prior authorisation from a competent authority of the recipient state.
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They assuredly will be respected at the time of realising a project activity under the CDM, since it must be approved by the designated national authority of both countries involved. The decision on alien species also advises exporting countries to carry out an appropriate risk analysis, which may include an environmental impact assessment, and to communicate any available information on invasive behaviour of a species, even if it is harmless in the state of origin. 36 The Cartagena Protocol also states in its Article 8(1) that the notification of the exporting state, prior to the intentional transboundary movement of a LMO, shall specify its identity and characteristics. Now, presentation of this information at the time of the technical description of the project activity, and undertaking by the project participants of an environmental impact assessment are uncertain, even though the project may entail significant risks on biological diversity. 37 Project participants could therefore freely plan their activity, irrespective of its environmental incidences, whereas transboundary movements of LMO and invasive alien species could be less strictly regulated under the UNFCCC than under the CBD.
34 Appendix B, § 2, b and j, i). 35 Decision VI/23, Guiding principle 10, § 1, Annex. The Cartagena Protocol provides in its Art. 7(1) that an advance informed agreement procedure shall apply to the first intentional transboundary movement of LMO. 36 Resp. guiding principles 10, § 1 and 4, § 1-2. 37 An environmental impact assessment will be notably undertaken 'if any negative impact is considered significant by the project participants', § 12, c, Annex.
THE SOVEREIGN APPRECIATION BY THE PARTIES TO THE UNFCCC OF INCIDENCES OF PROJECTS ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
Both parties involved in the project activity are not under any precise obligation in the matter of taking into account its eventual environmental incidences. Environmental risks incurred by the realisation of a project activity will be appreciated with sovereign power by the Southern countries (1), whereas Northern countries will decide about opportunity of using emission credits acquired through it (B).
The evaluation of risks on biological diversity by Southern countries
Developing countries which agree to host afforestation and reforestation activities under the CDM may solicit those kinds of forestry projects they consider will contribute to their sustainable development, and to the implementation of their national biodiversity law. 38 If the case arises, and if proposed projects can entail environmental risks, it will be difficult for them to oppose their realisation because of financial interest carrying out an activity in their jurisdiction. The countries themselves should, however, be able to do so. The designated operational entity will not be able to oppose the validation of a project because of its eventual adverse environmental impacts, except if it has been informed of this by one of both parties involved, stakeholders or a UNFCCC accredited NGO. 39 Opposition by an industrialised country to a project submitted by a legal entity it has authorised to participate under the CDM does not seem conceivable, except with respect to its public opinion. Opposition by stakeholders and NGOs should be complex too, as using alien invasive species and GMO is allowed by the decision on sinks in the CDM.
If any negative impact of the project is considered significant by a host party, the latter could request industrialised countries' investors to undertake an environmental impact assessment. 40 Conditioning the project approval by such a prior assessment could be quite tricky for them. Furthermore, the decision on sinks in the CDM only sets out that an environmental impact assessment will be undertaken 'in accordance with the procedures required by the host party', 41 without including any details on aspects to be analysed. Synergies with the CBD, and any guarantee of impact assessment efficiency, therefore seem doubtful. 42 As for evaluation of risks associated with the use of invasive alien species or GMO, it will 38 Parties to the CBD shall develop national strategies, plans or programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity (Art. 6 of the Convention), and promote compatibility and complementarity between these plans/programmes and other related initiatives (Decision VI/22, § 28). 39 § 15, Annex. 40 § 12, c Annex. 41 § 12, c Annex. 42 Parties to the CBD adopted in 2002 guidelines for incorporating biodiversity-related issues into environmental impact assessment legislation and/or process and in strategic environmental assessment, in the context of the implementation of Art. 14 of the Convention (Decision VI/7, UNEP/ CBD/COP/6/20). The draft text submitted by the SBSTA of the UNFCCC guaranteed a real appropriateness with this decision (options 3 and 4, Appendix E).
be undertaken by developing countries 'in accordance with their national laws'.
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Though this provision may appear surprising, it is in accordance with the current international law.
44
Where an environmental impact assessment would be undertaken, project participants must describe planned monitoring and remedial measures they intend to take in order to address noted impacts, which will be monitored by the designated operational entity when performing the verification of the project. 45 It should be the same if host parties consider that using invasive alien species or GMO may entail some risks. In this case synergies with provisions adopted within the CBD would be effective.
Evaluation of using emission credits by Northern countries
Compliance with the CBD can be guaranteed in two ways -two kinds of political decision more exactly -by parties subject to legally binding GHG emissions limitation and reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex I parties to the UNFCCC). The first consists in financing and authorising only the projects promoting biological diversity conservation. The second is based on not using emission credits generated from carbon sequestration project activities for the purpose of demonstrating their compliance with their commitments. The latter indeed implies for parties to the Kyoto Protocol to hold in their national registry, at the end of the commitment period, an amount of emissions units equal to their GHG emissions during this five-year period.
46 These units can be obtained through domestic measures, or purchased on the international emission trading market created by the Kyoto Protocol. Emissions units' traceability will allow states to choose among those available on the market. States could then, if they wish, oppose the acquisition of units generated from sinks-related project activity. This is the reason why the decision on sinks in the CDM states that 'parties included in Annex I evaluate, in accordance with their national laws, the use of […] units generated from afforestation and reforestation activities that make use of potentially invasive alien species […] and genetically modified organisms'. Moreover, although they will not be able to prevent their nationals from acquiring these emission credits, parties have the possibility to forbid their importation into their domestic emissions trading scheme. They indeed may decide to authorise national entities to participate in the emission trading mechanism established by Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, in order to help them meet their commitments.
43 Decision 19/CP.9. 44 The Cartagena Protocol, as the Decision on alien species, states that transboundary movements should not take place without prior authorisation of the recipient state. This Decision should be facilitated through information communicated within the clearing house mechanism, put in place in the context of the implementation of Art. 17 of the CBD. 45 § 12 (c) and 34 (c) of the Annex. 46 Draft decision -CMP.1, Modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts under Art. 7, para. 4, of the Kyoto Protocol, § 14 Annex.
Parties must to that effect establish their own scheme, in which they will devolve part of their emission units' assigned amount. It implies for national entities to be subject to an obligation to reduce GHG emissions, and consequently to regularly hold and surrender to the party an amount of units equal to their emissions. These obligations will be fulfilled through reduction of their own GHG emissions, or acquisition of units on the market. But opposition of the party to importation into its domestic trading scheme of units generated from carbon sequestration projects implies for a national entity not to use them for the purpose of demonstrating their compliance with their obligation to limit GHG emissions. In this case, they may only valorise these units on the international market, namely to sell them to entities authorised by their country to import them into their scheme. European firms will be confronted by this situation. The European Community decided to oppose the importation of emission credits generated from carbon sequestration project activities into the GHG allowance trading scheme it has established from 1 January 2005. 47 It must be underlined that the EC decision is not due to environmental or ethical considerations, but to the impact on emissions allowances prices. Conversion of these credits into allowances could help firms to meet their obligation to limit their GHG emissions, but reduce inducement to limit their own emissions too.
Carbon sinks have been the object of a number of significant controversies: initially when determining their potential exploitation under the Kyoto Protocol, and latterly because of their possible adverse impacts on biological diversity. The international community's efforts in favour of a synergy between the UNFCCC and the CBD gave rise to satisfactory results until 2001. The Marrakech Accords indeed took into account biodiversity-related concerns, by arranging for objectives of the CBD to be taken into consideration by market forces deployed within the Kyoto Protocol. The decision on modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM, adopted in 2003, however, represents a breaking off. It does not draw up any legal obstacle to activities potentially having adverse impacts on the environment, even though the CBD fails to be implemented, because of a lack of legally binding strength. Above all, it implicitly agrees the realisation of activities advised against by this latter, entrusting both parties participating in the CDM to decide on well-founded carbon sequestration projects. In other words, at the time of implementing this decision, parties to the UNFCCC, mostly parties to the CBD too, 48 will have to decide if they intend to guarantee compliance with its provisions. Both international conventions may thus be concurrently applied, but contradictions are conceivable, especially when one considers the financial interest in carbon sinks activities and the potential to disregard biodiversity-related concerns. There must be a considerable fear that biodiversity concerns will be marginalised on the pretext that the fight against climate change has higher priority. the Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project mechanisms (OJ L338/13.11.2004 ). 48 The UNFCCC and the CBD have, respectively, 189 and 188 parties.
